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Growing demand for food, feed, fuels and fibre, increased price volatility, combined with 
a shrinking resource base, and liberalisation of trade and investment regimes, are among 
factors causing increased commercial pressures on land and fuelling a new global rush 
for land. This primary affects agrarian economies, mainly in Africa and Asia. Lands that 
only a short time ago seemed marginal to investment interest are now being sought by 
international and national investors and speculators in quantities hitherto unseen. As 
such, growing foreign direct investments (FDI) into agriculture and a multiplication of 
investment projects on the African continent can be observed. For instance, in 2008 FDI 
into the African continent reached US$87,6 billion (i.e. 27 % higher than the previous 
year), of which a third (i.e. US$27 billion) towards the mining and agricultural sectors in 
Sub-Saharan African countries2. 
 
The investment flow towards agriculture, particularly in Africa – a sector severely 
neglected since the 1960s – can only be applauded. However, several questions remain: 
how inclusive are these investments? Are the African countries benefiting from these 
renewed flows of FDI? Do these investments lead to Africa’s green revolution or do they 
merely represent another resource grabbing era in the continents history? Analysing in-
depth the broader phenomenon is a step towards better understanding the present land 
rush and its implications. Based on results resulting from several projects (Commercial 
Pressures on Land project (ILC/CIRAD), financiarisation and corporisation of agriculture 
(CIRAD/UP)), the paper will first detail the features of the global land rush and present a 
deeper analysis of the processes at stake, particularly focussing on Africa. This will 
enable a presentation of the nature of these land-based investments. A second section will 
focus on the implications related (or not) to Africa’s green revolution. Emphasising the 
need to go beyond the “land grab” issue and its direct consequences, it recontextualises 
the rush for land in broader dynamics of agrarian transformations in Africa. If the present 
rush for land might represent a revitalisation of Africa’s agricultural sector, it is doubtful 
this revolution benefits the continent overall. 
 
Global features of the rush for land – Africa most targeted continent 
 
The most recent and well-informed data emerging from the LAND matrix provides 
evidence that the scale of the phenomenon is larger than (previously) assumed. As of 
September 2011, the Land Matrix contains reports of 2012 land deals, amounting to 
228,130,787 hectares of land worldwide. This includes all recorded deals that have been 
reported as approved or under negotiation. An idea of the scale of land reportedly under 
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investment interest is given by its equivalence to the combined surface area of Germany, 
France, Spain and UK3, representing about 4.7% of world’s agricultural land. These 
results are between 4 and 5 times more than the assessment of the World Bank 2010, 
detailed in their ‘Rising global interest in farmland’ report which presents a figure of 46.6 
million hectares as reported in the press between October 2008 and August 2009. 
 
Preliminary analysis from an ongoing cross-verification exercise suggests, nonetheless, 
that only about one third of the land reported as under investment interest is in reality on-
going and transferred. Of the 2012 reported deals, 1107 (55% of reported number of 
deals) have so far been verified, accounting for a total of 67,042,000 hectares (29% of 
reported number of hectares)4. The latter represents an area of the size of France and 
Belgium combined or 1.4% of world’s agricultural land. 
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Figure 1: The scale of reported and verified land acquisitions in the world 
Source: The Land Matrix, 2011 
 
These figures must be taken with caution; a significant proportion of 
unverified/unidentified deals have undoubtedly taken place. In reality, the gap is 
therefore likely to be smaller. However, it is nonetheless evident that a high proportion of 
deals that are announced do indeed never reach fruition. The gap between announcements 
and implementation should not create cause for complacency. First of all, 
announcements, negotiations and certainly contracts signed but not implemented may 
still exacerbate commercial pressures on land. Several case studies show that negotiations 
and contracts without effective implementation may translate into loss of land for local 
groups, even if the project is not implemented after all – for example in Ethiopia5. 
Africa is the prime target of the land rush 
 
Of the publicly reported deals, 948 land acquisitions of about 161.7 million hectares are 
located in Africa, while some 42.7 million hectares have reportedly been acquired in 
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Asia, and 17,6 million hectares have been acquired in Latin America. The remainder (5.4 
million hectares) concerns other regions, particularly Eastern Europe and Oceania). Of 
course, this regional distribution may reflect the strong media interest in African deals, as 
much as real-world differences in volumes of transactions. For example, some food-
importing African countries that are or were major recipients of food aid have attracted 
extensive media reporting, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, while scattered evidence suggests 
that there has been strong investor interest in Australia, New Zealand, North America and 
eastern Europe (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Reported and verified deals by region 
Source: Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
Countries like Madagascar, Mozambique and Ethiopia appear to be among the main 
recipient countries for cross-checked deals (see Figure 3). More deals signed or under 
negotiation in these countries may not have been reported in the media and may thus not 
be reflected in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Countries with highest land-based investments 
Source: Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
The rush for land is not only for agriculture 
 
With the pace of land acquisitions peaking in 2008 after the food price crisis6 (Anseeuw 
et al., 2012), much of the recent focus has been on investments in agricultural production 
for farmland. Agricultural production is indeed the primary driver behind the rush for 
land, with food crops accounting for 31% of the number of announced projects, biofuels 
29%, other non-food crops 6%, and livestock 3%. This gives a total of 69% of 
investments for whom the driver is known. However, other sectors are not insignificant: 
forestry and carbon sequestration, mineral extraction, and tourism account for a 
combined 11%, while others/not known is 15%. Although the latter are not always 
directly linked to the recent land acquisition phenomenon (many of the forest concessions 
did exist prior to 2007-2008); their growing importance in absolute terms translates 
however in increased commercial pressures on land at present (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Global land acquisitions by sector 
Source: Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
It also draws the attention to the different drivers priming in the different regions. As 
such, land acquisitions in Africa are for 38% orientated towards biofuels, whereas food 
crops tend to be more important in Asia (25% compared to 21% biofuels projects). In 
Latin America, on the other hand, acquisitions tend to be more mining oriented (17%) 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Global land acquisitions by sector and by region 
Source: Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
Africa’s investment remains extra-continental 
 
A large proportion of investment flows continue to originate from western countries. 
However, emerging economies are rapidly becoming a major source of investment. The 
Land Matrix suggests that Asia is a key region of origin.  While much public attention 
has been paid to the role of China, India and South Korea, investors from countries such 
as the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain as well as Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa and Brazil also 
appear to be active in land deal negotiations. The former originate from countries that are 
rich in capital, but that are endowed with limited quantities of natural resources necessary 
for the expansion of their agricultural production and of their economy in general. The 
latter (South Africa and Brazil), however, are countries that are mainly extending their 
influence and economic power within commercially profitable sectors (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Origin of investment per region 
Source: Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
If these shifting investment patterns suggest that regionalism and new South-South 
cooperation patterns may be on the rise, Africa’s investment still mainly originates from 
outside the continent. Africa’s farm land investments originate for 71% from outside the 
continent; whereas this amounts only to 9% in Asia. If there is a renewal of the 
investment flux on Africa’s farm land, they remain foreign owned. 
 
The investment dynamics – new actors, new investment models 
 
The renewal of these investment dynamics mainly concern three types of actors7. 
 
A first investor concerns tradition western food-producing, processing and exporting 
companies seeking to ‘square the market’. They mainly represent Western, private 
investors. One practice strongly appearing since a couple of years, is the partial 
integration of primary production, mainly to secure the access to primary production. As 
such, companies that used to rely on the market to access their produce, will engage 
(often up to 30% of their necessities) in primary production. 
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A second category of investors concerns land and water scarce populous and capital-rich 
countries. It is composed by countries such as China (20% of the world population for 
only 9% of world’s arable land) and other capital rich but food insecure Asian countries 
(South Korea) and Gulf States. These countries coordinate their investments off-sore, 
mainly through direct government involvement, State owned enterprises or sovereign 
wealth funds. The major characteristic of this model is the establishment of parallel 
value-chains in order to avoid markets (cindered to have become too volatile). 
 
Lastly, a third category is foreign to the traditional farming sector: it concerns financial 
actors, commercial banks, investment/pension/hedge funds, asset management 
companies, aiming to diversify their portfolios. As a result of the widely held predictions, 
they perceive the agricultural sector as an investment for the future and engage as such in 
"Malthusian oriented speculations". Besides being characterized by the speculative 
character, these models are often characterized by the implementation of finance-value-
chains, where financial services are often combined with marketing activities and 
possibly technical support8. Thanks to total control and to the circulation of capital and 
information flows, this approach aims at limiting transaction costs and the risks inherent 
to the agricultural activity, leading to extreme integration and internalization of the 
production. 
 
A common characteristic regarding this increasing control over land-based productive 
cycles, primary agricultural production in particular, is the establishment through a 
strengthened vertical integration. Downstream (including financing) and upstream 
activities (distribution and commercialization) are undergoing an ever-increasing 
concentration process to the advantage of some macro-actors. In addition to partnerships, 
contractualization etc., total integration of these activities allows dominant actors to 
widen their control over the productive cycle in its entirety. Compared to the well-known 
down and upstream integration by monopolistic agribusinesses (cf Cargill, Monsanto, 
etc.), the present integration processes, including the effective agricultural production, are 
presently being initiated from outside the agricultural sector, in particular by financial 
actors and engineering companies. Models vary according to the established organization 
(contracts, production outsourcing, etc.) and the actors involved (banks, intermediaries, 
investment funds, etc.). The approach is not new, and several agricultural export sub-
sectors (such as coffee, cotton, etc.) are already structured according to this model. 
However, over the past few years, this financial strategy has been applied more widely, 
both geographically and at the level of the concerned value-chains (e.g. cereal). 
 
Beyond loss of land … Agrarian change and social transformations 
 
With the spirit of optimism driving massive flows, but potentially putting livelihoods and 
food security at risk and shaping the future of global agriculture, there is a great need to 
take stock of the real outcomes for all those involved. Based on empirical evidence and 
experiences on the ground, the following section examines the outcomes and impacts of 
large-scale land acquisitions, focusing mainly on agriculture. 
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The effects of large-scale land acquisitions and wider commercial pressures on land can 
be conceptualized along several dimensions. They may be felt at a local level, at a 
national level, or at a global level through world markets and global ecosystems. They 
can include direct outcomes such as new employment or loss of access to a resource, or 
more indirect impacts such as changed food security, local or elsewhere. People may be 
affected in different ways. Income, livelihood security and economic development are 
important aspects; food production, availability and security are others. But issues of 
dignity, self-determination and the right of people to decide their own path of 
development and control their own food systems if they want to do so is also a critical 
issue9. Lastly, commercial pressures on land have different impacts on different groups of 
people. Such groups include international land acquirers and host country elites, the 
population of host countries and other countries, and the local communities directly 
affected. But it is also vital to remember that there are divisions and power relations 
within these groups. It is the poor who are most likely to be negatively affected, as are 
pastoralists and forest-dependent people. This notwithstanding it should be noted that 
commercial pressures on land is not a phenomenon only affecting pockets of rural 
minorities, but rural majorities, and indeed whole societies, in many parts of the world.  
 
Expectations rarely fulfilled 
 
The renewed interest of a diversity of investors seems to represent an opportunity for host 
governments to attract private, national and international, capital. As such, with reduced 
public spending and ODA, these investors are perceived as solutions to overcome the 
lack of public interest and investment for the discarded agricultural and rural sectors. For 
the first time since the late 1970s, there is an opportunity for African governments to 
attract investment for a sector that had been gradually relegated both in the public policy 
agenda as well as in private investors’ strategies. As such, these initiatives are promoted 
as contributing to the countries’ revitalisation of their agricultural sector (directly through 
large-scale investment or through a positive pull-effect integrating the host country’s 
small-scale farming sector), to enhance their national food security situation, as well as to 
develop rural infrastructure. This being said, these processes tend to fuel unrealistic 
expectations on the part of the host countries and local populations. 
 
Not only is often the production not developed according to plans and expectations, the 
accompanying promises – infrastructural development, employment creation, etc, are 
generally neither fulfilled. Several reasons do appear. Firstly, some operators may have 
underestimated the managerial and technical difficulties related to the implementation of 
large land deals in often difficult ecological, political, bureaucratic and socio-economic 
environments. This issue is likely to be particularly relevant to operators that do not have 
an established track-record in agriculture. Secondly, investors may not be successful in 
gaining the attributes they seek, thus leading the investor to pull out. This was reportedly 
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the case in Mali and Madagascar among others10. Brautigam gives the example of a 
Chinese parastatal backing down on its allegedly well-received request to access 100,000 
ha to three million hectares of forested lands to grow oil palm, following feasibility 
studies which showed insufficient transport and infrastructure support from the area11. 
Thirdly, some public announcements of land deal negotiations may reflect the strategic 
positioning of investors aiming for instance to secure land even in the absence of specific 
investment plans in the short term, other than an expectation that land prices will 
increase. 
 
On one hand, the loss of access to productive resources can have negative effects on 
income and compel the affected to seek other livelihood sources. On the other hand, 
investments can be a source of income for local populations, through wage employment, 
share-cropping and outgrower schemes, or locally negotiated land leases. But in all these 
instances, the income effects depend on the terms that have been negotiated, and thus on 
the negotiating power of the relevant parties. In other words, the sharing of income 
between investors and local populations depends on the level of wages, leases and other 
negotiated contractual terms, and on the price of agricultural supplies provided by small 
scale growers. In turn, these aspects are affected by varying degrees of control over 
resources, on market conditions (such as monopoly or monopsony structures), and on 
negotiating power.  
 
In the majority of the cases, only the better-off local farmers could adapt to the changing 
context and benefit from incoming investment, mainly through outgrower or 
sharecropping schemes. The others, particularly those who lost their land, faced a loss in 
income as an avoidable consequence. A Rwandan case-study provides a clear example of 
this. Only a relatively small number of farmers – those who were commercially oriented 
before the arrival of the agribusiness company - were able to retain access to land and 
work as outgrowers with the agribusiness; the others took up employment on the 
plantation or somewhere else. The study suggests that both groups considered themselves 
to be poorer than they were before the takeover by the agribusiness. The outgrowers 
complained about the conditions imposed by the agribusiness which benefits from its 
monopolistic position; the labourers about the bad labour conditions12.  
 
Also, several studies suggest that the hoped-for jobs do not necessarily materialise, partly 
because investments are often capital intensive and because local populations are not well 
integrated in the investment projects. Also, benefits in the form of local jobs are likely to 
be limited where investors can hire imported labour or, worse, can come with their own 
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labour. This commonly applies to recruitment for management and skilled positions, 
relegating locals to precarious, seasonal or low paid jobs (e.g. the Bechera agricultural 
development project in Ethiopia13). Lastly, when local people are employed, labour 
relations tend to be difficult14. These observations are all the more significant, as the lack 
of alternative livelihood options in these countries, exacerbated by reduced access to land 
as a result of the investment, constrain the affected populations’ ability to disassociate 
themselves from the investing companies. 
 
Lastly, benefits at national level have to be nuanced. Most of these investments focus on 
provisioning food and primary commodities, neither for local societies nor for export on 
international markets, but directly for the investor country through integration of the 
production process based on far-reaching vertical integration. This offshore production, 
besides the lack of local integration (import of machinery and labour) as seen here above, 
which is failing to circulate money in local economies, feeds into parallel markets 
enabling the investors to avoid world markets (becoming too unreliable) but failing to 
benefit local food production and security. These current mass investments in land-based 
production are thus not directly integrating poor agrarian economies with the global 
economy. Instead poor economies, while providing resources for the investors, are 
remaining in a client position. In these circumstances, host countries may find it difficult 
to exert their own priorities relating to agricultural development and national food 
security. Examples come from several cereal importing countries, where investors, 
mainly from the Arab countries, are producing and exporting cereals to secure their own 
food security situation15. In addition, countries tend to provide extensive benefits to 
investors. Critics argue that they have not attracted new FDI, but encouraged the shift of 
existing industry (foreign as domestic) to benefit from the lower tax regime and/or 
represent lost revenue when comparing exemptions and benefits versus productive 
income16. 
 
Direct negative impacts on local populations and agrarian economies 
 
Besides expectations not being realised, local populations may also be negatively affected 
by incoming investments. Although it is still too early to fully assess possible negative 
impacts of many of these investments, some evidence of early impacts do mushroom. 
Some adverse consequences are directly ascribable to an investment project, and may 
include for instance changes in access to resources – in particular land and water - and 
overall changes in local livelihoods, particularly in Africa’s agrarian societies. Other are 
indirect or broader but less directly observable; they might however, but in fact can have 
more comprehensive and deeper roots. 
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There is a widespread perception that much land is “empty”, “available” or “wilderness”. 
However, land that is not under permanent cultivation is more often than not the 
collective asset of rural communities under local tenure systems. These communally held 
lands, or ‘commons’ often make up the major land and resource asset of rural 
communities. Far from being idle or unused, such lands are in fact crucial elements in the 
system of customary or indigenous landholding and use17. They are also major 
contributors to livelihoods. Pastoralists and forest-dependent people are particularly at 
risk given the nature of their land use and their need for large land areas to survive18. 
 
In addition, despite the rhetoric of targeting marginal lands, acquirers are most interested 
in lands which are fertile, well-watered or with good rainfall, and easily accessed by 
roads or rail, and electricity transmission, market centres, habitation (helpful for 
employing people), and export servicing centres nearby. These are areas likely to be 
already used relatively intensively by local people, for farming or any other livelihood-
based activity. 
 
                                                      
17
 Alden Wily, L. (2011a). The tragedy of public lands: The fate of the commons under global commercial 
pressure. Wily contribution to ILC Collaborative Research Project on Commercial Pressures on Land, 
Rome. 
18
 Odhiambo, M. O. (2011). Commercial pressures on land in Africa: A regional overview of opportunities, 
challenges, and impacts. RECONCILE contribution to ILC ILC Collaborative Research Project on 
Commercial Pressures on Land, Rome. 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Land acquisition concentration in the Nile river basins  
Source: The Land Matrix, 2011. 
 
In most jurisdictions, water is owned by the government, in particular following reforms 
in the 1990s to implement Integrated Water Resource Management. Land deals for 
irrigation agriculture may grant acquirers priority access to water, or even an entitlement 
to specified quantities of water19. Where this happens, water abstraction and enforceable 
water rights may adversely affect water access for other users. Competing water interests 
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can be particularly difficult to manage in large transboundary river basins such as the 
Niger and Nile basins20. 
 
Effects of commercial pressures on access to land can also be seen through the lens of 
land concentration, whereby control of land resources becomes concentrated in ever 
fewer hands. This transformation from low input smallholder agriculture to large-scale, 
intensive and industrialized agriculture may imply a range of environmental 
consequences. These include land degradation, water pollution, excessive use of fresh 
water and heavy dependence on fossil fuels for machinery, fertilizer, pesticides, storage 
and transportation21. Meanwhile, the conversion of forested and uncultivated lands is 
associated with biodiversity loss, degradation, diversion of water from environmental 
flows and loss of ecosystem services such as the maintenance of soil and water quality, as 
well as carbon sequestration22. Several reports emphasize the depletion of forests. 
Observations of deforestation are widespread in the context of increasing commercial 
pressures on land23. 
 
If some of the local populations could reconvert or relocate, the development of the new 
activities are often to be realized in less favourable conditions, putting even more 
pressure on their already fragile farming activities and livelihoods. Reported cases are 
numerous. In Ethiopia, for example, although sharecropping practices are developing to 
allow access to land for those who lost or cannot obtain their own plots, these new 
practices are often not sufficient, leading more vulnerable farmers to abandon their lands 
and migrate to urban areas24. In Rwanda, the acquisition of fertile lands in the valley by a 
foreign company pushed the populations towards the less fertile lands situated on the hill 
sides. In every case it generates an important loss in terms of volume of production and a 
loss of income25. 
 
Further marginalisation of smallholder agriculture - Worsening and entrenching the 
root causes of the land acquisition phenomena 
 
The direct costs faced by local populations arising from the rush for land covered in the 
previous section are relatively straightforward; that the poorest members of agrarian 
societies risk losing their only major assets; land, water and housing. However, in 
addition to this, the rush for land has also indirect consequences, which threaten to 
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worsen and entrench deeply-rooted challenges to the sustainable livelihoods of the rural 
poor, of which the rush for land is a symptom, not a cause. As the latter encapsulate many 
of the conditions of agrarian economies and societies, the potential impact on the poor 
extends far more widely than the direct implications of dispossession from property. 
 
Becoming apparent is that the host economies remain marginalized from the renewed 
investments in agriculture. Not only not beneficial, many case-studies draw the attention 
on how these investments and acquisitions are further marginalizing local, often 
smallholder, agriculture. As discussed, the long-term nature of typical large-scale 
acquisitions (often involving durations of up to 99 years), effectively locks communities 
and smallholders out of land for several generations. This may bring about the end of 
cultivation and livestock rearing as traditional livelihood-supporting activities in affected 
areas. But not only is local populations’ arable land being lost directly; they also will 
have to deal with a less favourable socio-economic and institutional environments and 
increased, often biased, competition related to the arrival of these renewed actors and 
activities. 
 
In general, the rush for land and the resulting commercial pressures on land lead to a 
corporisation, of agricultural practices. They are associated with a trend toward 
concentration and intensification, with the marginalisation of family farming and the 
proletarisation of farmers which are becoming rent-seekers or landless labourers. Even 
where this could lead to increased productivity, there are real concerns that the more 
vulnerable groups will bear the costs without reaping the benefits. These concerns are 
exacerbated by the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities for people who lose land 
and do not manage to obtain employment in the newly established plantations. Many of 
the countries affected have not yet engaged in their secondary or tertiary sector 
revolutions, so that there are few alternatives to agriculture26. 
 
* Financiarization and corporization of agriculture 
 
First of all, the models show that new actors are appearing on the African agricultural 
scene. Indeed, originating from industrial or financial sectors, engaging as entrepreneurs, 
investors or even as pure speculators, the suppliers of capital seem more and more 
exogenous to the agricultural sector. Besides financing, these actors bring along renewed 
business logics, modes of actions and regulations, stemming from other sectors. As such, 
a restructuring of the sector is taking place which is redefining the borders of the 
agricultural sector. The increased role of banks and investment funds, for example, seems 
to lead to a "financiarization" of the sector. Indeed, the last couple of years, has seen an 
unprecedented boom in agricultural speculation. Whereas speculation has in the past been 
limited to an internal and short-term phenomenon, it has been evolving towards long-
term strategies, led by actors external to the sector27. As such, within the framework of 
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the futures markets exchanges (SAFEX in South Africa), a decreasing number of 
contracts result in an effective delivery. This trend is similar to speculative mechanisms 
in other sectors, real estate in particular. 
 
The African agricultural sector is currently also characterized by an industrialization 
process, or rather a "corporization" process. This dynamic is not a mechanization per se 
but rather a transformation of the production structures and their interactions. 
Increasingly, the agricultural value-chain tends to be controlled by one dominant actor. 
The control over various segments along this chain is established either through direct 
acquisition, or through contractualization of the actors. While in South Africa the 
dominant actors include banks and certain former cooperatives, elsewhere other models 
engaging different macro-actors are emerging (e.g. Uruguay28). The organization of 
agricultural production tends towards a strongly integrated structure, comparable to 
Taylorist industrial chains, in which the most risky segments are outsourced towards 
intermediaries who support the costs and the risks. 
 
This dual process of – “financiarisation and corporisation” of the agricultural sector is 
leading to a new regime which is characterized by the dominion of a few large 
international food-business groups29 and could lead to the marginalization of the majority 
of African farmers due to biased power relations and confrontation with models of 
significantly higher productivity30. 
 
* Concentration and dualisation within the sector 
These evolutions tend to strengthen the dualism within the African agricultural sector. 
Whereas the macro-actors of the food-processing industry see their dominant positions 
strengthened, entire fractions of the (rural) African society are excluded from these 
dynamics. Indeed, the selection process operated collectively by banks and insurance 
companies excludes the small as well as the emerging farmers. As the selection criteria 
includes farm size (farms under 500ha under production are generally not considered by 
the financial institutions, for example), solvency and prior experience of/with the farmer, 
only well-established commercial producers are eligible. The entry barriers (capital, 
control over flows, compliance with standards, etc.) are increasingly strenuous, limiting 
the possibility to participate for the majority of the producers and leading to amplified 
concentration. The evolution of the primary production segment seems to follow 
downstream (fertilizers, seeds, inputs) as well as upstream (processing, marketing, etc.) 
activities, which are highly concentrated, characterized by a limited number of actors 
controlling these markets at national31 or international32 level. 
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Two groups of actors seem to benefit in particular from the agricultural restructuring. 
First of all, the financial sector (financial institutions, insurance companies, investment 
funds) which, by directly adding primary production to their portfolio and by taking over 
the activities of a large proportion of their normal clients, they control an increasingly 
large portion of the sector, impose their selection criteria on producers and become the 
regulators of the sector. By integrating the entire value-chain and by centralizing the 
information flows, they anticipate the evolution of these markets, in particular the prices, 
act as arbitrators of these markets and seem to be capable of influencing the prices in 
their favour by speculating on the increase or decline according to the applicable 
forecasts. The second group to benefit from the evolution of the production structures are 
the agricultural intermediaries. Indeed, the financial institutions which intend investing in 
the agricultural sector increasingly depend on the services of agricultural engineering 
companies. As managers of both the field operations as well as  the financial transactions, 
these companies are capturing an increasingly large portion of the margins generated by 
the agricultural activity. 
 
* Speculation and foreign powers 
 
The control of agricultural production by a small number of macro-actors,  representing 
in many cases foreign capital, raises not only the problem of concentration and 
dualisation of the sector, it also draws attention to the need to analyse this phenomenon 
within the framework of the strategies of these actors. Indeed, the strong volatility of 
agricultural prices, strengthened by the removal of stabilization mechanisms in the 
context of market regulations, facilitates economic agents’ direct involvement and control 
over agricultural regulation mechanisms. On one hand, speculation strengthens profit-
oriented strategies, to the detriment of food safety concerns in the countries where the 
effective production takes place. On the other hand, as foreign economic powers control 
an increasingly large part of the production, it also emphasizes food sovereignty issues 
within these countries in a context of amplified liberalization. Producing countries’ food 
safety and sovereignty are thus at stake. 
 
Indeed, as noted by the special Rapporteur on the right to food33, a significant part of the 
volatility and the rise in prices can be explained by the emergence of speculation and an 
essential role is attributed to the participation of powerful institutional investors 
(investment funds, pension funds, commercial banks, etc.). These entities are often 
foreign owned with limited or no interest in the objectives of stabilization, food safety 
and food sovereignty. While the price volatility of agricultural commodities and the 
strategies of speculation raise problems related to the implementation of development 
programs, they also emphasize questions regarding the regulation of the agricultural and 
financial sectors and regulatory frameworks in a large number of domains including the 
functioning of the futures markets and foreign trade. It also leads to considerations related 
to national policies, the development of sector-based and financial strategies and regional 
integration. 
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* Marginalisation, proletarisation and pauperization of the agricultural society 
 
While the emergence of these new production models generates numerous economic 
related uncertainties, it is the social impact which is most concerning. Indeed, one of the 
common characteristics of these innovations seems to be the increased marginalization of 
producers and farm workers. 
 
The incorporation process of family-based producers by macro-actors detrimentally 
impacts the latter. Both parties have diverse financial, social and cultural resources 
leading to biased relationships, which seem to extend beyond the traditional cleavages 
within the African agricultural sector34. Land owners find themselves incorporated into 
production chains in which they are isolated actors with no decision-making or 
orientation power. Generally, the technical capital used, characterized by ever-increasing 
costs, does not belong to them but is made available by the management company. This 
situation creates a dependency for the farmers, since they become unable to withdraw 
from these production relations, without losing their access to the necessary financing 
and inputs. The granted funds are short-term, often linked to the production cycle and 
correspond with the amounts calculated according to the production of specific quantities. 
As such, allocated funds do not allow additional productive investments and seems to 
condemn the producer to renew his/her seasonal commitment year after year. Although 
they are land owners, their situation is increasingly similar to that of proletarian 
agricultural employees or of service providers. 
 
These transformations not only impact the producer as economic agent, but in particular 
also as social actor. This "corporisation" perturbs social relationships and traditional 
features characterizing Africa’s agricultural and rural environments. The family unit 
constituted until now the basic structure around which agricultural production was 
organized, both in smallholder and commercial farms. The incorporation of autonomous 
family enterprises into entrepreneurial structures necessarily modifies the relationships 
with the agricultural sector. Beyond the producers and landowners, farm workers are also 
negatively affected. The recourse to agricultural technologies that require low, often 
seasonal labour, tends to exacerbate the precariousness of the working conditions35. 
 
Conclusion – A green revolution in Africa: probably, but not by nor for Africa 
 
The paper contributes towards building an understanding of the range and magnitude of 
the risks and opportunities at stake. The evidence emerging from the empirical results 
presented and other existing studies confirms much of the wider evidence; models of 
investment that are predicated on acquiring large tracts of land will most likely not yield 
significant benefits locally, and, in fact, the manner in which the global rush for land is 
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currently taking place is deepening underlying causes, which entrench the challenges 
faced by rural families to escape from poverty, hunger or marginalisation. The paper 
shows that the African farming sector is presently undergoing significant restructurings, 
characterized by the “financiarisation” and "corporisation" of agriculture. These changes 
are leading to the concentration of agricultural activities in the hands of a few, mainly 
foreign, traditionally non-agricultural actors. A further characteristic of the process of 
restructuring is the "agricultural proletarianization", which is taking place and 
transforming family farmers into rent-seekers and/or agricultural workers on their own 
lands. Although these transformation might lead to a green revolution in Africa, it is 
certainly not engaged in by Africa and it is doubtful that it will greatly benefit the 
continent. 
 
This transformation of investor interest in African agriculture is on course to produce a 
revolution in this once-neglected sector. But the impact of renewed foreign investor 
interest in land acquisition and the attendant implications for questions of ownership and 
land tenure is only a part of the impact being felt by African communities. The changing 
structure of agricultural production, based on renewed production and investment models, 
goes beyond the issue of the land itself. On one hand, it emphasizes the renewed political 
economy in which these transformations takes place, ranging from new investor/donor-
led strategies to changing geo-political contexts (emergent countries’ strategies and the 
role of agriculture thereof, new North-South relationships, etc.). On the other hand, it 
raises broader questions about the trajectory of agricultural development on the continent 
with implications related to the role for African smallholders and the place of African 
agriculture in an emerging global production system. The latter lies at the foundation of 
the present agricultural development tensions: the debate between small-scale agriculture 
and the large mechanized operations, the opposition between speculative investment and 
food security and the questions related to the promotion of foreign investment and food 
sovereignty. 
 
In the absence of alternative successful investment and production models, agricultural 
development centered around large-scale land investments have become the reigning 
paradigm. While this is currently being adopted by capital-poor African countries, trying 
to attract private, national and international, capital with the aim to overcome the lack of 
public interest and investment for their discarded agricultural and rural sectors, the model 
appears also to be indirectly promoted by the public development agencies (NEPAD36, 
AFDB37, etc.), as they support  the establishment of large-scale investments funds. They 
particularly underline the lack of reflections and debates around the implications of these 
transformations regarding national and international development policies and 
trajectories, whether agricultural or not, for these developing countries in search of 
alternatives. 
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